

20 MARCH 2002



Security

HIGH-RISK RESPONSE

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OPR: HQ AFSFC/SFOP
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Certified by: HQ USAF/XOF
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Pages: 48

Distribution: F

This manual provides guidance for security forces personnel to use during security forces activities. It applies to military, civilian and contract personnel as well as military personnel assigned from other US military branches assigned or attached to Air Force units. Maintain and dispose of records created as a result of processes prescribed in this AFMAN in accordance with AFMAN 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule*. Refer recommended changes and conflicts between this and other publications to HQ AFSFC/SFOP, 1720 Patrick Street, Lackland AFB, TX, 78236, on the AF Form 847, **Recommendation for Change of Publication**. It applies to military, civilian and contract personnel as well as military personnel assigned from other US military branches assigned or attached to Air Force Units.

Chapter 1—GENERAL INFORMATION	4
1.1. Lead Agency Concept.	4
1.2. Air Force Philosophy.	4
1.3. Duties and Responsibilities.	5
1.4. On-Installation Incidents.	6
1.5. Off-Installation Incidents.	6
1.6. Containment Policy.	7
Chapter 2—DISASTER RESPONSE	8
2.1. Planning.	8
2.2. Scope of Responsibility.	8
2.3. Exercises.	9
2.4. Explanation of Terms.	9

2.5. Phases of Response.	11
2.6. Disaster Control Group (DCG) Actions.	14
2.7. Security Representatives Immediate Action.	15
2.8. Security Forces Control Center Actions:	15
2.9. Establishing Cordon, Entry Control Point (ECP) and Evacuation.	16
2.10. Evacuation.	16
2.11. Release of Information.	16
2.12. Important Considerations After an Accident.	17
2.13. Control of Photography.	17
2.14. Responsibilities in Foreign Areas.	18
2.15. Civil Defense Warning and Notification System.	19

Chapter 3—BARRICADED SUBJECTS 21

3.1. Initial Response to Barricaded Subjects.	21
3.2. Containment of the Scene.	21
3.3. Establishing Jurisdiction and Command and Control.	21
3.4. Negotiations.	22
3.5. Reasoning Behind the Taking of Hostages.	22
3.6. Types of Hostage Takers.	23

Chapter 4—DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ABUSE RESPONSE 26

4.1. Domestic Violence.	26
4.2. Definitions.	26
4.3. Spouse Abuse.	27
4.4. Child Abuse and Neglect.	27
4.5. The Security Forces Role in Domestic Violence.	28
4.6. The Unit Commander's Role in Domestic Violence.	29
4.7. The Family Advocacy Officer's Role in Domestic Violence.	29
4.8. The Security Forces Controller's Role in Domestic Violence	29
4.9. Patrol Response.	29
4.10. Differentiating Types of Disputes.	31
4.11. Attitude of Responding Security Forces.	32
4.12. The Interview.	33
4.13. Security Forces Actions.	33

Chapter 5—PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE	35
5.1. School Violence.	35
5.2. Planning.	35
5.3. Reporting.	35
5.4. Initial Response.	35
5.5. Media.	36
5.6. Parents.	36
Chapter 6—WORKPLACE VIOLENCE	37
6.1. Workplace Violence.	37
6.2. Planning.	37
Chapter 7—USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD	38
7.1. Introduction:	38
7.2. When to Convene a Board and Its Purpose.	38
7.3. Board Members and Their Responsibilities.	38
7.4. Legal Considerations for a Shooting Incident.	39
7.5. The Use of Force Review Board Report.	39
Chapter 8—SECURITY FORCES POST-SHOOTING PROTOCOLS	40
8.1. Introduction.	40
8.2. Background:	40
8.3. The Basic Model.	40
8.4. Family Issues.	43
8.5. Successful Coping.	43
8.6. Positive Aspects.	44
8.7. Forms Adopted.	44
Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION	45
Attachment 2—SECURITY FORCES FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT	47

Chapter 1

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1. Lead Agency Concept. Public Law 93-366 and several national security directives outline the management of US Government response to high-risk incidents on federal property or terrorist incidents against US citizens, facilities and/or interests. These publications identify a lead agency for coordinating US Government actions to resolve both terrorist and high-risk incidents. Specifically, lead agency designations include:

1.1.1. The Department of State (DOS). The DOS assumes lead agency responsibilities for managing terrorist incidents overseas involving US Government or military affiliated personnel, facilities and materials.

1.1.2. The Department of Justice (DOJ) assumes lead agency responsibility for terrorist and high-risk incidents within US territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is the lead US Government agency for investigating criminal acts committed against US Government offices and employees on US Government reservations including military installations or against US Government property. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is the lead Air Force agency responsible for criminal investigations on Air Force installations and serves as liaison with the FBI. For additional information regarding the investigative jurisdiction of AFOSI and Security Forces see AFI 71-101, Vol 1, *Criminal Investigations*, Attachment 2. The FBI also has the following responsibilities:

1.1.2.1. Maintains civilian counterterrorist capabilities for response to criminal or terrorist incidents within the United States, its territories and its possessions.

1.1.2.2. Conducts assessments and evaluations of aviation security measures and procedures with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

1.1.3. The FAA is responsible for the prevention of and response to aircraft piracy within the special jurisdiction of the United States. This special jurisdiction includes all airspace used for aircraft travel within the United States and its territories. The US Government vests the FAA with exclusive responsibility for the direction of law enforcement activity during a hijacking involving in-flight aircraft within the US. For purposes of assigning responsibility in these matters, "flight" begins when support personnel close and secure the aircraft door and the aircraft is no longer dependent on ground service. The FBI has jurisdiction when the aircraft is not in flight. If the hijacking occurs overseas, the host nation, in conjunction with the DOS and Department of Defense (DoD), manages intervention. For further information see AFI 13-207, *Preventing and Resisting Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking)*. The FAA is also responsible for domestic airport security programs and provides substantial technical and policy advice on US Government international aviation security efforts. It also provides technical assistance to the international community to improve security at international airports serving passengers destined for the United States.

1.2. Air Force Philosophy. While installation commanders have the authority to handle certain high-risk incidents that are criminal in nature (that is, barricaded suspects), the Air Force philosophy is to fully comply with the lead agency concept by yielding to civilian authorities such as the FBI whenever possible. The primary Air Force goal in dealing with these high-risk situations is to prevent or minimize loss of life and property by containment, negotiation and referral when necessary. This goal is best

achieved by working with AFOSI to develop a local memorandum of agreement with the FBI that includes provisions for the FBI's special teams to rehearse and train on the installation.

1.3. Duties and Responsibilities. Resolution of hostage incidents on federal property involves many agencies and personnel. Installation plans should identify the role of key base agencies in resolution of high-risk incidents. Installation contingency plans must also address the use of security forces to isolate, contain and neutralize a terrorist or hostage incident, with or without FBI assistance. Contingency plans should address the use of installation security forces, other military forces and host nation resources. Installations on foreign soil must coordinate plans with host nation and the State Department (normally the regional security officer of the US Embassy). In overseas situations, the status of forces or other agreements and understandings determine the use of host nation resources instead of US forces. **NOTE:** This manual does not apply to recapture/recovery operations for nuclear weapons. Refer to DoD 5210.41M/AF Sup 1, Nuclear Security Weapons Manual.

1.3.1. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs. The SAF/PA provides public affairs guidance and authorizes local responses to news media inquiries for hostage situations.

1.3.2. HQ USAF. HQ USAF/XOF and SAF/IG develop policies and procedures for hostage situations.

1.3.3. Installation Commander. Installation commanders:

1.3.3.1. Prepare contingency plans and maintain a capability to counter hostage and high-risk situations on their installations.

1.3.3.2. Organize, train and equip base units to implement the plans.

1.3.3.3. Maintain responsibility for hostage situations until appropriate authority directs otherwise.

1.3.3.4. Determine the need for emergency service teams (ESTs).

1.3.3.5. Determine the response time based on the local threat.

1.3.3.6. Take immediate action as dictated by the situation to prevent loss of life or lessen property damage before the FBI response force arrives. If the FBI declines jurisdiction, the Air Force will act to resolve the incident.

1.3.4. The installation chief of security forces (CSF) is the primary advisor to the installation commander on hostage negotiations and EST employment. He/she must be fully knowledgeable of the capabilities and qualifications of his/her forces.

1.3.5. AFOSI Detachment. The servicing AFOSI detachment is the Air Force liaison with all federal agencies on criminal investigations and will maintain close coordination with civil authorities to exchange information that could indicate a threat to individuals or property on a military installation. This office also provides investigative support within its capabilities when needed.

1.3.6. Local Law Enforcement. The roles of state and local law enforcement agencies are much more difficult. Each installation establishes unique alliances in the form of jurisdictional agreements. Commanders, staff judge advocates and chiefs of security forces must become familiar with these local arrangements and comply with the negotiated policing protocols.

1.4. On-Installation Incidents. Although the DOJ is the lead agency designated for coordinating US Government actions to resolve terrorist and high-risk criminal incidents and the FBI is the investigating/response agency, installation commanders have inherent authority to take necessary measures to maintain law and order on installations and to protect military personnel, military family members, facilities and property. This authority also includes removing or denying installation access to those individuals who threaten the orderly administration of the installation.

1.4.1. Role of the Installation Commander. Installation commanders must provide for initial and immediate response to any incident occurring on the installation. Additionally, commanders must contain damage, protect property and personnel and restore order. To perform these functions, commanders may order searches and seizures and take other necessary steps to maintain law and order.

1.4.2. Role of the FBI. The FBI works with and through AFOSI to coordinate criminal investigations on Air Force installations in accordance with DoD Directive 5525.7, *Implementation of Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense Relating to the Investigative and Prosecution of Certain Crimes*. If a service member is not a suspect in the incident, the FBI eventually assumes investigative responsibility for the incident and the DOJ will prosecute, if appropriate. At what point the FBI assumes operational control of an incident depends on the incident and previously executed agreements. Although the FBI may have operational responsibility for an incident, commanders continue to be responsible for protecting the military property and interests of their command. Commanders should work with the FBI to assure protection of military property. Commanders must allow the FBI to perform its lead role in reacting to terrorist or high-risk incidents when these military interests are not prejudiced. For more information, see DoD 0-2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*.

1.5. Off-Installation Incidents. The FBI is the lead federal agency for containing and resolving terrorist incidents occurring off the military installation. AFOSI maintains liaison with the FBI on terrorist and high-risk incidents occurring off military installations that may impact Air Force operations. Posse Comitatus Act prohibits military personnel from enforcing civil law (with very limited exceptions). DoD Directive 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, implements DoD policy. However, if military equipment, property, documents or personnel are at risk, the commander is ultimately responsible for their protection. For example, in the case of an aircraft crash that occurs outside the confines of a military installation, the commander has the option of declaring an exclusive zone around the crash site known as a national defense area (NDA) to support his/her capacity to protect military equipment, property, documents or personnel.

1.5.1. National Defense Area (NDA). NDAs contain and secure federal government resources in the US and US territorial areas that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the DoD. The Air Force may need to establish an NDA if:

1.5.1.1. Aircraft divert to civilian airports.

1.5.1.2. An aircraft carrying nuclear weapons makes an emergency landing.

1.5.1.3. It is necessary to temporarily halt nuclear weapons ground convoys.

1.5.1.4. An aircraft crashes.

1.5.1.5. Other unplanned emergency occurs.

1.6. Containment Policy. It is both customary and usual for military commanders to assume responsibility for initial response, containment and resolution of criminal incidents that occur on DoD facilities within the US, its territories and its possessions. In fact, DoD installation military commanders and civilian managers have responsibility and authority for initial response to contain and/or resolve criminal incidents on their installation.

1.6.1. Beyond Containment. Given the FBI's role in leading the US Government's response to terrorist and high-risk incidents, investigation of United States Code (USC) violations and their investigative role when prohibited acts are committed abroad, the preferred solution to any high-risk situation is to respond and contain the incident until FBI contact is made. Installation commanders may choose to establish and train security forces (SF) as emergency service teams to handle a wide range of high-risk situations. If commanders decide to pursue this option, they must seek specialized training from the FBI, local law enforcement agencies or other branches of the service.

Chapter 2

DISASTER RESPONSE

2.1. Planning. Because of the security forces mission, SF personnel cannot afford to wait until disaster strikes before taking action to protect resources and personnel. On the contrary, SF personnel must be able to cope with any situation that might occur. Base disaster preparedness operations plans (Base OPLAN 32-1) outline the needed operations and actions to cope with on and off base emergencies and disasters. Normally, security forces are the first to arrive at the scene of an accident. Therefore, it is important that SF personnel become familiar with the terms, duties and responsibilities associated with disaster preparedness.

2.1.1. Annexes. Each base OPLAN 32-1 will contain the following minimum annexes:

2.1.1.1. Annex A: Major Peacetime Accident.

2.1.1.2. Annex B: Natural Disaster.

2.1.1.3. Annex C: Enemy Attack.

2.1.1.4. Annex D: Distribution.

2.2. Scope of Responsibility. The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for major accidents involving DoD material or resulting from DoD activities. The installation nearest the scene of a major accident involving DoD resources responds to the accident.

2.2.1. Nuclear Weapons. For accidents involving nuclear weapons or their components, installations conform to the DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons and components except in a crisis where certain designated authorities may release information. The two levels of response for a nuclear weapons accident are the initial accident response and response by the disaster control group (DCG).

2.2.1.1. Initial Response Base. The initial accident response is accomplished by the nearest military installation, regardless of size, to an accident. The installation:

2.2.1.1.1. Takes immediate emergency measures and provides a federal presence and humanitarian support.

2.2.1.1.2. Performs emergency operations to save lives, secure the site, safeguard classified materials, confirm or deny the presence of contamination and contain the hazard.

2.2.1.1.3. Remains in charge until the DCG arrives or when a non-DoD agency has custody, the agency response force relieves it.

2.2.1.1.4. Maintains a presence at the accident scene to support the DCG.

2.2.1.2. Disaster Control Group. The DCG assumes overall command and control at a nuclear weapon accident. It is a composite of military and civilian staff and other governmental agencies. An Air Force DCG manages and coordinates actions required to recover from an accident involving Air Force resources. When deployed, the Air Force on-scene commander (OSC) is the Air Force executive agent and assumes command and control.

2.3. Exercises. Air Force installations must conduct major accident, attack and natural disaster response exercises. Security forces can expect installation exercise teams to conduct a major accident response exercise at least once every quarter. Anticipate scenarios developed around the installation security plan and other emergency plans. The following is a sample of the types and frequency of exercises that can be anticipated:

- 2.3.1. Conventional munitions at least once a year.
- 2.3.2. Chemical agents at least once a year if the installation stores, ships or employs chemical agents or munitions.
- 2.3.3. Nuclear weapons at least once a year for all installations.
- 2.3.4. Hazardous material emergency response teams at least once a year.
- 2.3.5. Immediate reaction drills should be accomplished daily.

2.4. Explanation of Terms. Some accident, disaster and incident scenes are classified as natural while others are man-made. The distinction between natural and man-made is of little help when disasters strike. More important is what can be done when they occur to alleviate their effects.

2.4.1. Man-Made Disasters. There are many types of man-made disasters. Some involve nuclear/chemical weapons, biological agents, components or other hazardous materials. These cause extensive damage to federal and/or civil property, mass casualties and may have a significant impact on the USAF. For ease of learning we classify the following disaster and emergency situations as man-made:

2.4.1.1. Nuclear Weapons Mishaps. Accidents, incidents or deficiencies involving nuclear weapons may occur under a variety of conditions. The following flag words identify such mishaps:

2.4.1.1.1. Broken Arrow. Nuclear weapon accident.

2.4.1.1.2. Bent Spear. Nuclear weapon incident.

2.4.1.1.3. Dull Sword. Nuclear weapon deficiency.

2.4.1.1.4. Nucflash. Accidental or unauthorized launching of a nuclear weapon which could create the risk of war.

2.4.1.2. Nonnuclear Accident. An accident with nonnuclear weapons could result in a heavy loss of personnel, materials and facilities. This type of accident could seriously disrupt, restrict or bring to a halt, operational activities for a period of time.

2.4.1.3. Accidents Involving Chemical Agents or Toxic Materials. Accidents involving chemical agents or other toxic materials can result in the contamination of extensive areas. This is particularly true of areas downwind from the accident. Disaster preparedness plans, therefore, contain procedures for evacuation of nonessential personnel from the area and should provide for the use of protective equipment and clothing for response personnel entering the contaminated area.

2.4.1.4. Local Emergencies/Accidents. Local emergencies and/or accidents, on or off base, involving Air Force or other Department of Defense resources, could result in extensive damage to property and a large number of casualties. Aircraft crashes in populated areas, fires, explosions, accidents involving toxic fuels or chemical agents or other hazardous items being transported on public highways or in the hands of government contractors are examples of local emergencies or disasters that may require response by Air Force commanders. Disaster preparedness planning

includes such measures as evacuation of nonessential personnel, on-base dispersal and shelter for personnel.

2.4.2. Assistance in Natural Disaster Relief Operations. The following natural disasters can pose significant challenges, depending upon location: Hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, severe snowstorm, drought and fire.

2.4.2.1. DoD Policy. DoD policy is to assist civil authorities with personnel, equipment or other services when disasters are beyond the capabilities of civil resources. There are three categories of emergencies in which DOD provides help:

2.4.2.1.1. Major Disaster. Military installations must provide disaster relief (consistent with defense priorities) once the President declares a major disaster requiring federal emergency assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must request such help through the Army.

2.4.2.1.2. Emergencies. Military installations must provide resources when the President declares an emergency exists and FEMA requests military assistance.

2.4.2.1.3. Imminently Serious Conditions. Commanders of military installations must provide assistance when a serious disaster is so imminently as to preclude instructions from higher headquarters. Commanders must act promptly to save human life, prevent human suffering or reduce great destruction of or damage to, property.

2.4.2.2. Concept of Operations. Natural disasters can create emergency conditions, which vary widely in scope, urgency and degree of damage and destruction.

2.4.2.2.1. While there is no way to specifically define the actions to be taken in each possible disaster situation, the basic objective of the Air Force concept of operations for disaster relief operations is to provide a single point of control for employment of Air Force personnel and resources in any type of natural disaster.

2.4.2.2.2. This is essential to prevent duplication of effort, ensure that only the minimum amount of Air Force resources required are committed and that those resources committed are used effectively. This same basic concept applies whether the disaster relief effort is provided by a single Air Force installation or when the requirements are so large as to require support from many resources within the Air Force.

2.4.2.2.3. When requested by proper authority to provide assistance to civil authorities in emergencies caused by natural disasters, commanders should withhold those resources required to maintain the capability to conduct immediate wartime missions.

2.4.2.2.3.1. All other resources, including those used in support of administrative, training and other support activities, will be made available in minimum quantities required to protect life and property in the event of a natural disaster.

2.4.2.2.3.2. It is the commander's responsibility to evaluate the situation and determine the amount of support the installation can provide. As a guiding principle in Air Force disaster relief operations, commanders may commit resources on a minimum quantity/essential basis and terminate support as soon as the relief effort has ended.

2.4.2.2.4. Commanders should be prepared, if their installation is the military installation nearest to the disaster, to furnish the initial assistance required.

2.4.2.2.4.1. During this initial period, an Air Force OSC should be appointed who will exercise operational control over all US Air Force resources employed in the disaster relief operation.

2.4.2.2.4.2. Law enforcement activities in natural disaster relief situations are limited to assisting civil authorities.

2.4.2.2.4.2.1. Such activities will consist primarily of directing traffic and controlling access to the area.

2.4.2.2.4.2.2. Commanders must ensure the commitment of resources does not constitute a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act which prohibits the use of any part of the Air Force to execute local, state or federal laws, unless authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.

2.5. Phases of Response. Generally, the actions taken to properly contend with accident, disaster and incident scenes consist of notification, response, response force actions, withdrawal, recovery, circulation and/or crowd control and release of information or permission for photography.

2.5.1. Notification. This action is to inform nonessential personnel to evacuate the accident area, to notify the Disaster Control Group (DCG) and higher headquarters of available information pertaining to the accident.

2.5.1.1. For personnel near the danger area, word-of-mouth reports and the sight of the disaster may fulfill the immediate notification requirement. Regardless, other pre-determined immediate notification measures must be in place.

2.5.1.2. Notification of personnel at greater distances, who may not be aware of the situation, could require either personal contact or use of public communications systems, including emergency warning networks (radio), “giant voice,” sirens and television broadcasts.

2.5.1.3. If housing is endangered, a door-to-door notification is made, usually by security forces or other base disaster personnel. When notifying personnel in a building, such as barracks or apartment, SF personnel may designate someone to notify the other personnel within the building. This will relieve SF members to do other notifications or help direct evacuation from the area. Ensure building occupants know what direction in which to evacuate. Use of a “giant voice” system may also be helpful in making notifications.

2.5.1.4. In civilian communities, the assistance of local law enforcement or other civil agencies and radio and TV stations should be enlisted.

2.5.1.5. The public affairs officer makes contact with the news media; therefore, it is imperative all staff agencies coordinate their media contacts with the civilian community through the public affairs officer. This is to ensure the release of information is within security limitations.

2.5.1.6. Notification of the DCG is made by the Command Post using a pre-established system.

2.5.1.7. Procedures must be established for relaying accident reports to the command post, fire or crash station, base operations and control tower.

2.5.1.8. Notification data given by an observer should include the following, but should not be delayed:

- 2.5.1.8.1. Site of the accident.
- 2.5.1.8.2. Nature of the accident.
- 2.5.1.8.3. Estimated number of casualties.
- 2.5.1.8.4. Name and location of the reporter.

2.5.1.9. Notification to higher headquarters is accomplished through the use of an OPREP-3 report, RCS: HAF-XOO (AR) 7118. Initial reports of accident/disaster situations often do not portray the true situation. Reports of major accidents are normally made in haste by individuals who may be either emotionally involved or who have misinterpreted what they have seen. It is therefore important that an objective, on-the-scene assessment be made as rapidly as possible.

2.5.2. Response. This consists of all actions taken to respond to, suppress or contain the accident, including the assumption of command and control at the scene.

2.5.2.1. Response to all potential or actual major accident situations must be made rapidly and effectively.

2.5.2.2. Responses are always made by an initial response force and a follow-on force.

2.5.2.2.1. An initial response force consists of elements necessary to assume control of the situation, make objective evaluations, establish an entry control point, establish a parking plan, perform lifesaving steps, suppress hazards and perform containment actions and information services.

2.5.2.2.2. Follow-on forces consist of support teams whose makeup is determined after evaluation.

2.5.2.3. The initial response force deploys directly to the accident area. The follow-on forces deploy either to the on-scene control point (as in the case of an accident on or near the base) or to a convoy assembly area in the case of an accident located at a greater distance.

2.5.2.4. An individual who is first aware of the accident situation is responsible for the following:

- 2.5.2.4.1. Reporting the accident.
- 2.5.2.4.2. Initiating rescue and care of the injured.
- 2.5.2.4.3. Suppressing hazards (within their capabilities).

2.5.3. Withdrawal. This action is used when forces combating an accident are in imminent danger of being injured or killed by an explosion or the release of toxic materials. If there is no danger of explosion or release of toxic material, withdrawal may not be necessary until containment has been completed.

2.5.3.1. The fire chief is responsible for initiating withdrawal. The OSC must make sure that all required actions are completed.

2.5.3.2. The fire department sounds vehicle sirens, horns, etc. and announces withdrawal over the public address system until withdrawal is complete.

2.5.3.3. All personnel depart the accident area as rapidly as possible. No one is allowed to reenter the accident area unless specifically authorized by the OSC.

2.5.3.4. Withdrawal should be accomplished in an upwind or crosswind direction.

2.5.3.5. Safety considerations are paramount when withdrawal time is not known or extenuating circumstances exist. If a nuclear weapon/nonnuclear weapon is involved and the time the weapon may become engulfed in flames can be calculated, withdrawal should be completed prior to the known time.

2.5.3.6. If there is no imminent danger of injury to DCG members, they can continue working until all containment actions are completed and then withdraw.

2.5.3.7. If contamination is suspected in the area, vehicles withdrawing from the site should be abandoned close to, but inside, the cordon to prevent unnecessary spread of the contamination. If the vehicle is suspected of being contaminated, it must be left inside the cordon.

2.5.3.8. Personnel withdrawing from the accident site are monitored and decontaminated as necessary. Casualties who can tolerate decontamination before evacuation to a medical facility are decontaminated at the site. Those requiring immediate medical care to prevent loss of life will be treated before being decontaminated.

2.5.4. Recovery. This is a complex, time-consuming operation that could take from days to months to accomplish.

2.5.4.1. If withdrawal has occurred or entry to the accident site has, for any reason, been denied, reconnaissance is necessary to gather facts to determine courses of action during recovery operations.

2.5.4.2. Specific information obtained during reconnaissance depends on the extent of the accident. This information may include:

2.5.4.2.1. Casualties.

2.5.4.2.2. Contamination.

2.5.4.2.3. Classified material.

2.5.4.2.4. High explosive hazards.

2.5.4.2.5. Hazardous atmosphere or environments.

2.5.4.2.6. Condition of weapons.

2.5.4.3. The initial reconnaissance team consists of specialists who are capable of evaluating conditions at the accident site and obtaining the necessary information.

2.5.4.4. Vehicles may be used during the initial reconnaissance if they do not present a hazard.

2.5.4.5. The initial reconnaissance teams may use radios, but radios should not be used to report team findings if such use could lead to security violations or unnecessarily alarm outside listeners. Radio transmissions must not be used near explosive munitions due to the possibility of premature detonation.

2.5.4.6. Based on the findings of the initial reconnaissance team and other known facts, a recovery plan is developed. After the plan is approved, the following actions are initiated:

2.5.4.6.1. The distance between the control point, cordon and nearest hazard must be established and adjusted by competent personnel (normally the on-scene fire chief) based on the situation.

2.5.4.6.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel should begin munitions safety procedures and explosive hazard removal, if necessary. If EOD personnel are not organic to the installation, EOD must be requested from the nearest military installation or other resource.

2.5.4.6.3. Medical representatives and bioenvironmental engineers collect and submit environmental samples for analysis. They also advise the OSC on precautions to take and what survey and decontamination procedures to start.

2.5.4.6.4. Civil engineer team members prepare estimates to report damage to government and civilian property.

2.5.4.6.5. At on-base accidents, the public affairs officer escorts civilian media personnel (if authorized by the OSC) to the accident scene after weapons or similar classified material are concealed or removed. At off-base accidents, the public affairs officer will follow the provisions of AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*, on control of photography to prevent compromise of classified information and material.

2.5.4.6.6. Personnel required at the scene will enter at the control point after they have been fully informed on the location of known hazards and precautions to be taken such as safety restrictions, allowable stay time, use of protective equipment and regulations against smoking.

2.5.4.6.7. Personnel and equipment leaving the scene are checked for contamination at the contamination control line. If contamination is found, personnel are processed through a personnel decontamination station. Equipment is isolated until it can be decontaminated.

2.5.4.6.8. The staff judge advocate, accompanied by a civil engineer or a medical officer, visits personnel who suffered property damage or physical injury as a result of the accident. A medical officer reviews personal injuries with a physician from state, federal or foreign public health services.

2.5.4.6.9. Responding agencies should maintain daily activity summaries during recovery operations.

2.6. Disaster Control Group (DCG) Actions. If the accident site (area affected by the accident) is located within the military installation, the OSC, firefighters, medical personnel, security forces, civil engineers and aircraft maintenance forces should respond directly to the accident scene.

2.6.1. Responding forces should approach the site from upwind (wind blowing against the back) and do whatever is necessary to contend with the disaster (i.e., aid to injured, evacuation, fire fighting, setting up the cordon)

2.6.2. Other DCG members and support team personnel should report to the entry control point (ECP) located on the established cordon perimeter.

2.6.3. If the accident site is located off base and close enough to be contained, the DCG responds immediately to the scene and takes appropriate actions.

2.6.4. If the accident location is such that the DCG could not possibly arrive in time to contain the accident, the nearest civilian community or military installation should be requested to provide fire, medical and security support at the scene.

2.6.5. An initial force, normally consisting of civil engineers, aircraft maintenance crews, medical personnel, fire chief and a security forces officer should proceed to the scene as rapidly as possible.

2.6.6. Local planning should consider the use of available helicopter and mission support aircraft to airlift these personnel to the accident scene.

2.6.7. All other DCG members and support teams assemble at a designated area and are convoyed to the accident scene, if they are required at the site.

2.7. Security Representatives Immediate Action.

2.7.1. On-Base Accidents.

2.7.1.1. Reports to accident scene.

2.7.1.2. Ensures security forces are establishing a cordon.

2.7.1.3. Establish and mark the ECP and establish parking plan as specified by the fire chief.

2.7.1.4. Notify the Security Forces Control Center of accident and control point grid coordinates.

2.7.1.5. Monitors evacuation of cordon.

2.7.2. Off-Base Accidents.

2.7.2.1. Provide initial security response unit(s) to report to the on-scene commander.

2.7.2.2. Request assistance from civil police, as required.

2.7.2.3. Conduct on scene action:

2.7.2.3.1. Report to convoy assembly area and check in with the disaster preparedness officer/NCO.

2.7.2.3.2. Notify Security Forces Control Center of ECP grid coordinates.

2.7.2.4. Follow-on units.

2.7.2.4.1. Report to convoy assembly area and check in with the disaster preparedness officer/NCO.

2.7.2.4.2. Check security elements for equipment, maps and clothing.

2.7.2.4.3. Brief all convoy drivers on road conditions.

2.7.2.4.4. Assign security forces vehicle to lead the convoy.

2.7.2.4.5. Contact the security forces at the scene.

2.7.2.4.6. Provide materials to erect cordon perimeter.

2.7.2.4.7. Participate in the preparation of the recovery plan.

2.7.2.4.8. Relocate control point, if required by the OSC.

2.8. Security Forces Control Center Actions:

- 2.8.1. Plot accident scene on map.
- 2.8.2. Dispatch security forces.
- 2.8.3. Maintain contact with security forces.
- 2.8.4. Accomplish appropriate checklist.
- 2.8.5. Accomplish notifications.

2.9. Establishing Cordon, Entry Control Point (ECP) and Evacuation. Each accident scene must be cordoned and an ECP established. Some incidents will require an evacuation.

- 2.9.1. Cordon. A cordon surrounds the accident area where controls are established to preclude unauthorized entry.
 - 2.9.1.1. The cordon size is dictated by fire department personnel.
 - 2.9.1.2. The area affected by the accident and the requirement for DCG working room will dictate cordon sizes for disasters that do not involve toxic or explosive materials.
- 2.9.2. Entry Control Point.
 - 2.9.2.1. The ECP location is established by the fire chief and initially located upwind, on the perimeter of the cordon, within a 90-degree arc on either side of the current surface wind.
 - 2.9.2.2. The ECP must be marked with flag and sign. At night, vehicle, flood or similar lights should illuminate the ECP.
 - 2.9.2.3. The ECP may be relocated to enhance entry and exit control procedures.

2.10. Evacuation.

- 2.10.1. If required, all nonessential personnel must be directed to evacuate the accident scene in an upwind direction.
- 2.10.2. Removal of aircraft, missiles and other equipment requiring specialized actions is the responsibility of maintenance forces.
- 2.10.3. Personnel evacuating the area should remove equipment, vehicles and material from the danger area.
- 2.10.4. Priorities for evacuation are:
 - 2.10.4.1. Injured personnel.
 - 2.10.4.2. Endangered personnel.
 - 2.10.4.3. Equipment carrying hazardous material.
 - 2.10.4.4. High-value or mission essential equipment.
 - 2.10.4.5. Fatalities.

2.11. Release of Information. The definition of release is public affairs material prepared for distribution to any medium of mass communications that normally disseminates facts or news to the public or the act of disseminating information in oral, pictorial or printed form to such medium or the public. Release

of information also includes release of records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as required by Title 5 United States Code, Section 552, and outlined in AF Supplement to DoD 5400.7-R. At an accident scene or situation, security forces refer all questions to the Public Affairs Office.

2.11.1. Air Force Policy. Air Force policy is to keep the public informed, on a timely basis, of unclassified information concerning Air Force activities, whether favorable or unfavorable.

2.11.1.1. The Installation Public Affairs Officer will promptly release unclassified information about Air Force accidents or mission aircraft. This must be released promptly to news media representatives and recognized news gathering agencies. Process written FOIA requests through the installation FOIA manager as outlined in AF Supplement to DoD Regulation 5400.7.

2.11.1.2. Air Force units will provide maximum cooperation, consistent with national security responsibilities, to properly identified US news media representatives who are covering military accidents.

2.12. Important Considerations After an Accident.

2.12.1. Rescuing the injured.

2.12.2. Preventing further injury and loss of life.

2.12.3. Protecting property and investigative data from loss or damage.

2.12.4. Safeguarding classified information.

2.12.5. Meeting the needs of public information.

2.12.5.1. Satisfying these urgent requirements under the trying conditions at an accident site calls for close cooperation and mutual understanding between the Air Force and news media representatives.

2.13. Control of Photography. Photographs are motion picture film, videotape, negatives, prints, slides, digital photographic equipment, vu-graphs or any similar graphic item. The process of making such items is photography.

2.13.1. Control of photography outside military installations within the United States and its territories:

2.13.1.1. The authority of AF public affairs personnel, on-scene commanders, accident boards and security forces is limited in dealing with news media, particularly in an off-base accident site.

2.13.1.2. The senior AF representative at the scene must determine, as soon as possible, whether classified information is present.

2.13.1.3. If no classified information is exposed, the AF representative may permit photographs. If classified information is exposed, it will be covered or removed immediately before permitting photographs.

2.13.1.4. If exposed classified information cannot be removed or covered, the senior AF representative will advise news media representatives that permission cannot be given to take photographs. He/she will also ask them to cooperate in its protection. The media will be informed that violation of the prohibition on photographing classified information also constitutes violation of federal

criminal statutes. However, no physical effort will be made to preclude such photography, nor will force be used.

2.13.1.5. If someone takes photographs after being warned, Air Force officials must ask civil law officers to stop further photography of the exposed classified information and to collect or get back all photographs (including exposed and unprocessed film).

2.13.1.6. If no civil law officers are on the scene and unauthorized pictures are taken, no seizure of the film or restraint of the photographer is permitted. Instead, the senior Air force official at the scene or the responsible AF installation commander must:

2.13.1.6.1. Immediately contact the managing editor or news director of the newspaper, magazine or television station employing the photographer.

2.13.1.6.2. Explain the situation.

2.13.1.6.3. Request the return of the film having suspected classified information.

2.13.1.6.4. Explain that failure to return the material to military authorities violates federal law.

2.13.2. Control of photography off base in a foreign country.

2.13.2.1. Any Status of Forces agreements, the laws of the host nation and other instructions of the unified commander responsible for that area will govern action restricting photographs.

2.13.2.2. Overseas commanders should publish instructions stating policy on relations with civilian news photographers at accident sites.

2.13.3. Control of photography inside an Air Force base. If no classified information is exposed, the commander may allow news photographers to take pictures. Exposed classified information, which cannot be covered or removed, should not be photographed by the news media. In this case, the commander:

2.13.3.1. Notifies the news media of the situation.

2.13.3.2. Bars photographers from the site.

2.13.3.3. If photographs are taken, the medium on which the image was recorded (e.g., film, disc, video tape) will be taken into military custody for prompt development and examination. Ensure the medium is protected from exposure. Do not seize any hardware. Receipts for photographs will be given.

2.13.3.4. Upon development, photographs that show no classified information will be returned to the person who took them. Any photos that display classified data will be turned over to the AFOSI.

2.13.3.5. The public affairs officer should release official Air Force accident photographs that do not show classified information, bodies or parts of bodies. This applies only to official photographs and does not mean that the presence of bodies is in itself a reason to stop civilian media photography.

2.14. Responsibilities in Foreign Areas.

2.14.1. The Department of State, in cooperation with the Agency for International Development, is responsible for determining US participation in conducting disaster relief operations.

2.14.2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided instructions regarding the use of military resources in such operations to the Commanders in chief (CINCs) of unified commands for foreign areas.

2.14.3. Air Force installation commanders in these areas should include in their disaster preparedness operations plans the guidance and procedures necessary to ensure prompt and effective response to the requirements of the CINC of the unified command.

2.15. Civil Defense Warning and Notification System.

2.15.1. Warning Signals:

2.15.1.1. Attack Warning:

2.15.1.1.1. A 3 to 5 minute wavering tone on base and local sirens.

2.15.1.1.2. If whistles, horns or other devices are used instead of sirens, a series of short blasts will be sounded for the same period of time

2.15.1.1.3. This signal indicates the necessity to take immediate shelter or other protective measures.

2.15.1.1.4. The signal may be repeated as often as necessary to assure response by the base population.

2.15.1.2. Alert Signals:

2.15.1.2.1. Use 3 to 5 minute steady tones on sirens or other warning devices.

2.15.1.2.2. This signal will be used to alert personnel of imminent peacetime emergencies, i.e., tornadoes, flash floods and seismic waves.

2.15.1.2.3. Personnel should then monitor radio, TV, base PA or sound trucks for additional instructions or information.

2.15.1.3. Additional signals may be used to meet the unique requirements of any command or installation.

2.15.1.3.1. To ensure mutual understanding between military personnel and the civilian population, commands must use the same warning signals used by the local civil defense agencies.

2.15.1.3.2. To prevent false alerting of the adjacent civilian population (particularly during tests and exercises), installation commanders will coordinate with local civil agencies so that the local populace will know that the military signals apply to Air Force base personnel only.

2.15.2. Notification Systems.

2.15.2.1. Each Air Force installation establishes procedures, using existing communications systems, to provide for both an overt and covert notification system.

2.15.2.2. Radio nets, base stations, base telephone switchboards, staff duty officers, control center's giant voice and so forth must have procedures for relaying notification reports to the command post, fire/crash station, base operations, control tower, etc.

2.15.2.3. Base primary and secondary crash phones may also be used.

2.15.2.4. Consideration can be made to using e-mail, cable television override on the installation and the commander's channel.

Chapter 3

BARRICADED SUBJECTS

3.1. Initial Response to Barricaded Subjects. In high-risk situations, it is important that security forces immediately contain or enclose the scene. On-duty security forces personnel probably are the first to respond and arrive. As the initial responding unit, the security forces member is responsible for several things. The first arriving unit should assume command and control until relieved by a competent authority.

3.1.1. Responding units must keep the security forces control center informed of the following:

3.1.1.1. Arrival on scene.

3.1.1.2. Position.

3.1.1.3. Safe avenues of approach for other responding units.

3.1.1.4. Status of the situation.

3.1.2. To reduce risk to him/herself, the security forces member should take a covered position where they can best see what's happening while preventing the suspect from escaping. Immediately evacuate all nonessential personnel far enough away so they are in no danger of being taken hostage or hit by a suspect's fire. Do not allow volunteers (wives, husbands, mothers, neighbors, etc.) to start any negotiations.

3.2. Containment of the Scene.

3.2.1. Establish a cordon. Security force members always establish an all-around (360 degree) cordon at hostage and anti-hijack scenes. SF personnel do this by setting up inner and outer perimeters. How far these perimeters are established from the scene depends on the scope, complexity and location of the incident.

3.2.1.1. Outer perimeter. The outer perimeter is established to prevent people from interfering with recovery operations and to keep innocent bystanders and onlookers from being hurt. This perimeter should be established outside the maximum effective range of any weapons the hostage takers have, if SF members can establish the type/caliber of the weapon/s involved. Direct all vehicles and pedestrians not involved in recovery operations away from the threat scene. Set up an ECP along the outer perimeter in an area that is easily accessible to responding units. Send all persons who need to enter the area to the ECP.

3.2.1.2. Inner perimeter. Normally, on-duty security forces personnel initially set up the inner perimeter to contain the immediate scene. Specialized teams may replace security forces personnel posted on the inner perimeter if they are available and appropriate for use by the OSC. Security forces can adjust the inner perimeter as needed. Due to the dangers involved, strict control of the area must be maintained. Only key people such as EST, negotiation teams and the on-scene commander are allowed within the inner perimeter. EST is responsible for searching and clearing the inner perimeter. At this point the installation commander could choose to have the lead agency assume control of the situation.

3.3. Establishing Jurisdiction and Command and Control.

3.3.1. Air Force Philosophy. Even though installation commanders have the authority to refuse to allow the FBI to handle certain high-risk incidents that are criminal in nature (e.g., barricaded suspects), the Air Force philosophy is to fully comply with the lead agency concept by yielding to civilian authorities like the FBI, when possible. The primary Air Force goal in dealing with high-risk situations is to prevent or minimize loss of life and property by containment, negotiation and referral as necessary.

3.3.2. The role of local law enforcement. Roles of state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are more difficult. The type of jurisdiction (exclusive, concurrent or proprietary) will dictate civil and military roles. Coordinate with the installation staff judge advocate prior to employment of off base law enforcement.

3.3.2.1. Exclusive jurisdiction. For installations or portions of installations under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the state and local LEA have no jurisdiction or authority, though they may seek or be asked to assist with security precautions and other duties consistent with their respective interests (e.g., off-installation traffic control, sealing the area). Commanders should exercise caution when employing state and local LEAs in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction because such personnel may not fall within the scope of their state duties and also may not fall within the protection of federal status.

3.3.2.2. Concurrent or proprietary jurisdiction. If an incident occurs in an area of concurrent or proprietary jurisdiction, the status of the state and local LEAs is clearer, but roles in responding to the incident remain uncertain. The commander exercises broad and ultimate authority to maintain law and order on the installation, notwithstanding concurrent state jurisdiction. The commander may also deny entry to or remove from the installation anyone who poses a threat to good order and discipline. It is recommended that the installation commander pursue memorandums of agreement with local law enforcement agencies to define response strategies and division of responsibilities.

3.4. Negotiations. The principle method for peacefully resolving a high-risk situation is through the use of a negotiator. Each installation must have available the services of a trained negotiator. Negotiators may be drawn from the security forces, AFOSI, FBI or local civilian LEAs. The source for the negotiator is determined by the resources available in any given area and may be influenced by the incident itself, i.e., the FAA is responsible for aircraft hijackings. The source for the negotiator capability must be determined in advance and available 24 hours a day for immediate recall. A combination of sources may be used, i.e., AFOSI and security forces. For further information concerning negotiations, refer to AFMAN 31-201, Volume 5, *Emergency Services Teams*.

3.5. Reasoning Behind the Taking of Hostages.

3.5.1. Hostage taking represents a unique bargain struck over the value of human life. Whatever the immediate motivation, the basic purpose remains the same. Hostage taking is a way of setting up a bargaining position to achieve an otherwise unattainable objective.

3.5.2. A victim may be chosen because of their value to someone. Our government will not negotiate with suspects. This does not diminish the victim's value to their family, their employer or themselves. There are numerous examples in which ransom demands have been met by private efforts. This may free the hostage but unfortunately further promotes such acts.

3.5.3. A victim may be chosen because they are prominent, because of job position, because of status or simply because they are an American.

3.5.4. A victim may be hated by their captors. The terrorist organization may blame the victim directly for any setbacks it has suffered or may foresee disaster in the near future due to their individual work.

3.5.5. Because of their desire for publicity, some subjects do not kidnap a victim without telling someone. Their philosophy is: the higher the status of the victim, the more publicity the event will solicit.

3.5.6. The victim may be seen as a source of trouble.

3.5.7. Most of the time, the hostage is just an innocent victim of circumstance who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

3.6. Types of Hostage Takers. Some barricaded suspect cases involve hostage taking. Hostage taking, by the very nature of this act, forces the terrorist into stereotyped responses. The hostage becomes a pawn, caught between the terrorist and authorities. The terrorists become violent strive to control the situation and move the event toward completion of their objective. The hostage, by conduct, can enhance or diminish their chance of survival. The more the hostage understands about their hostage taker, the better they will be able to predict the hostage holder's behavior and feel some degree of control, which can assist in diminishing fear.

3.6.1. SF personnel categorize hostage takers merely to provide guidelines. Some hostage taking involves terrorist activities and can be categorized.

3.6.1.1. The real identity of the terrorist can only be examined in the context of their relationships to the people, organization, places, ideas and historical context with which they are associated.

3.6.1.2. The question one must ask when examining an action is "does the ideology support the actual beliefs of a group or is it merely a tool used to justify their actions?"

3.6.2. Terrorists are usually well organized. At the top of a pyramid-like structure, single, urban, bright and dedicated idealists can be found. Often, this layer of terrorists comes from professions such as medicine and law. The lower down in the ranks of a terrorist organization one looks, the greater the diversity of personality styles one sees: the disillusioned, the mentally ill, sociopath recruited from prisons and the ideologically motivated. There are also those who are monetarily motivated, the mercenary-style terrorists and those seeking some form of personal revenge. Almost all terrorist organizations form a cross-section of the population from which they emerge. The group performing the hostage taking will in turn be a representative slice of the organization. This slice performs its operations in support of the larger organization's long-range goals.

3.6.2.1. Political Extremists. These hostage takers often operate within a military-like structure. This control factor may hold violence within planned limits. Still, within the group there may be one or more terrorists whose propensity for cruelty makes them more dangerous. While they may be held in check by their group leadership, it is important to identify them early in the event and spend extra effort to avoid moving these extremists to confrontation.

3.6.2.1.1. The average age of most political terrorists ranges between 19 and 35. The youth factor heightens their fanaticism, blinds them to reasonable dialogue and insulates them to appeals based on moral decency or fear for their own safety. While the political extremists are

often prepared to die for their cause, they are not necessarily suicidal. When the chances for success dwindle, their primary concern often changes to escape.

3.6.2.1.2. Political extremists usually only take hostages only when they have control over the general terrain where the event will take place or when a friendly or neutral country may provide shelter. Hostage taking by this group of terrorists can be viewed as a barometer of political extremism in a geographic area.

3.6.2.2. Religious Fanatics. These hostage takers generally fit one of three categories. They are usually either a member of a recognized religion or a radical offshoot of that religion, member of a cult or religious loner. No religion has been without its excesses. Rather than become cynical toward religion, personnel should acknowledge that unsavory aspects of the religious extremists result from human failings, corruption and inadequacy rather than an imperfection of things divine.

3.6.2.2.1. Religious fanatics share a common, unshakeable belief in the righteousness of their cause and appropriateness of their actions. Hostage takings and other terrorist-like actions seem to increase in number when traditional value systems are threatened, change or appear to collapse. With the exception of the loner, religious fanatics typically have a charismatic leader and preach a form of exclusivity by which only the select can enter heaven. Therefore, if an individual is a member of another sect, they are an enemy. Like political extremists, religious fanatics can admit no fault in their dogma. If they perceive hostility toward their religion by the hostage, they may react with violence. Feeling superior because of their beliefs, they may be inflexible and express a preference for death. The death wish is strong in many religious fanatics.

3.6.2.2.2. A second category of religious fanatics can be found in cults. Cults can be defined as religions without political power. While cults do not present as significant a threat as more conventional and widely known religious extremist groups, they do contain the potential for violent confrontation and hostage takings for a wide variety of reasons.

3.6.2.2.3. Some religious extremists who engage in terrorism may seek a violent death at the hands of a nonbeliever. Terrorists of this variety see themselves answerable only to God. Their conduct is often irrational and extremely defensive. They feel threatened by any miss-description of their leader, their beliefs or their activity. They may believe that to die is the holiest achievement possible. Because of that belief, they may be suicidal. They may seek violent resolution to the situation by killing hostages to satisfy that drive.

3.6.2.2.4. The lone religious fanatic, while not often encountered, could present the gravest threat. They will be even more detached from reality and less rational than the one belonging to a group. This religious fanatic claims to be operating on direct divine orders. Because of that he/she is probably the most dangerous and least susceptible to reason.

3.6.2.3. Fleeing Criminal. This criminal has been thwarted in the completion of their crime. They take hostages on impulse to avoid immediate apprehension and to have a bargaining chip for their escape. They do not want to die and have no cause for which to die. This hostage taker tends to be impulsive. They will often settle for much less than originally demanded when they recognize they are in a no-win situation, provided they are able to save face, maintain dignity and not experience a sudden loss of power. A sudden loss of power can create agitation, despair or panic which

can lead to the impulsive killing of a hostage. Time is on the side of peaceful resolution. In this era of electronic media, criminals may resort to political rhetoric during the negotiation process.

3.6.2.4. Wronged Person. This type of hostage taker seeks to notify society of the defects in the "system" or "establishment" because of some disagreeable experience. They may be seeking redress of the experience or publicity of the wrong. This person takes justice into their own hands. Group dynamics outside the hostage situation become complicated, because there bound to be some groups of people who have suffered the same type of social injustice and who will create backing and support for the hostage taker. This situation is different from the political hostage taking in that it is motivated by a wish for personal revenge. The hostage taker is convinced that they are absolutely right and behaves in a grandiose fashion. These factors are accentuated by media coverage and also by the media coverage of sympathetic outside groups. In the hostage taker's mind, this may justify violence toward the hostages. The hostages may represent the "system" or whatever the hostage taker wishes to avenge, which therefore puts the hostages in a dangerous situation. This type situation occurs in clusters because of the media and outside sympathetic group dynamics; thus, media restraint is required to avoid a future epidemic of "wronged person" hostage taking. Gentle persuasion is required to convince the hostage taker that what they need to end the situation will be provided.

3.6.2.5. The Mentally Disturbed Person. Many hostage takers are mentally disturbed or under the influence of a drug or narcotic. Hostage taking by a mentally disturbed person may be either spontaneous or planned. It is surprising to see how well planned the situation may be in spite of the hostage taker's obvious psychosis. For many mentally ill persons, there are intermittent periods of lucidity in the psychosis, so it may take an extended period of contact before craziness is revealed in the hostage taker's speech. The delusions and hallucinations probably will not impair their ability to do what they wish with the hostage holding situation. Rapport may be difficult to achieve and maintain, but efforts to that end should be consistent. In almost all cases, the mentally ill hostage taker will also have a death wish that can only be satisfied by the murder of the hostages, suicide or both. Hostages should conduct themselves in a very relaxed, laid-back, nonassertive manner. They should avoid prolonged eye contact with the hostage taker and allow the hostage taker to control the situation and conversation.

Chapter 4

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ABUSE RESPONSE

4.1. Domestic Violence. Family violence is a serious national problem. One has to only read the daily paper or watch the evening news to hear reports of violence in the home. The Air Force is no different. As a security forces member one can expect to encounter a potentially violent incident of domestic violence. Security forces personnel need to know how to diffuse these incidents and regain control of the situation.

4.1.1. Risk. Responding to family violence is difficult, demanding and sometimes a dangerous job. Situations of family violence are inherently dangerous. The risk of injury to a family member or the responding security forces member is always present. Each year law enforcement personnel, including some security forces, are injured or killed responding to family violence calls.

4.1.2. Recurrence. Studies have shown that family violence calls are often repeat calls: when the initial call is not effectively handled, it is likely the situation will recur and the patrol person will be called again. By learning how to recognize child abuse/neglect and spouse abuse and by acquiring the skills necessary to act accordingly, SF personnel can:

4.1.2.1. Avoid repeat calls.

4.1.2.2. Provide protection to victims of family violence.

4.1.2.3. Reduce the likelihood of injury to the family member.

4.1.3. Critical Role. Security forces personnel have a critical role to play both in restoring order and preventing future incidents of family violence. Security forces are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They are trained to respond in an emergency and have transportation and communication equipment immediately available. Security forces also have the authority to intervene and, if necessary, to apprehend in order to restore order and protect lives.

4.2. Definitions. In discussion of family violence the following definitions will be used:

4.2.1. Child. An unmarried person whether a natural child, adopted child, foster child, stepchild or ward who is a family member of the military member or spouse and who either:

4.2.1.1. Has not passed their eighteenth birthday; or

4.2.1.2. Is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical incapacity that currently exists and for whom treatment is authorized in a medical facility of the uniformed services.

4.2.2. Spouse. A partner in a lawful marriage.

4.2.3. Abuse. Physical injury or emotional disturbance, inflicted by other than accident, as evidenced by, but not limited to, scratches, lacerations, skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, sexual molestation or abuse, burns, bone fractures, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling and unexplained death; or where the history given concerning such a condition is at variance with the degree or type of the condition or where circumstances indicate the condition may not be the product of an accidental occurrence.

4.2.4. Child Neglect. Neglect is failure to provide a child with the basic necessities of life. The lack of medical care, inadequate nourishment, insufficient clothing, lack of supervision and unsafe living

conditions may indicate neglect. However, care must be taken in differentiating willful neglect from poverty. Impoverished families may be providing the best care possible within their means.

4.2.5. Air Force Family Advocacy Program. The Air Force-wide program developed and designed to identify, prevent and treat those consequences of child abuse and neglect and spouse abuse and to provide other necessary medical and nonmedical services for victims and perpetrators of child abuse or neglect and spouse abuse.

4.2.6. Child Advocacy Program. That part of the Air Force Family Advocacy Program that deals with child abuse or neglect.

4.3. Spouse Abuse. Spouse abuse includes wife battering, husband battering and simultaneous fighting in which either or both spouses may be assaulted.

4.3.1. Types: Three types of spouse abuse are generally recognized. All types are dangerous. Even a single episode must be taken seriously because it may result in severe injury or death.

4.3.1.1. Physical battering, which includes punching, kicking, beating, stabbing, shooting and other forms of physical assault.

4.3.1.2. Sexual battering, which includes physical attacks on the victim's breasts or genitals and forced sexual activity.

4.3.1.3. Psychological battering, which includes harassment, threats, (e.g., suicide threats or threats to harm the children) and deprivation of food and sleep, accompanied by a history of at least one incident of physical or sexual battering. Another example of psychological abuse could include the destruction of property, pets or both, of value to one spouse - a beloved dog, a car or heirloom china.

4.3.2. Characteristics. Spouse abuse occurs among all ethnic, racial, age and economic groups. It is frequently linked to alcohol abuse. Spouse abuse tends to be recurrent, increasing in severity and intensity unless there is appropriate, timely intervention by those trained to work with both the aggressor and victim.

4.4. Child Abuse and Neglect. Like spouse abuse, child abuse and neglect may be found in families of all ages, race and ethnic backgrounds and at all economic levels. Victims may be of any age from infancy to adolescence, but the majority are of school age. However, children under the age of three are most likely to be severely injured by the abuse.

4.4.1. Types: Three types of child abuse and neglect are recognized. The four types often occur in combination. Thus a physically abused child also may be emotionally maltreated; a sexually abused child also may be neglected. Sometimes one child in a family is singled out for abuse or neglect; this child becomes the family scapegoat. In other families, all of the children may be abused or neglected. Children of any age may be abused or neglected.

4.4.1.1. Physical abuse, includes nonaccidental injuries such as burns, spiral fractures of the arms or legs and bruises in various stages of healing. Sometimes a pattern of injuries can be discerned (e.g., bruises on both sides of the face or a glove or sock-like burn). Sometimes the mark of the implement used to injure the child can be seen (e.g., the imprint of a belt buckle, looped electrical cord or a cigarette burn).

4.4.1.2. Sexual abuse, includes sexual intercourse; sexual contact, such as fondling of the genitals; exhibitionism, such as masturbation in the presence of the child; and sexual exploitation, such as child pornography. The sexually abused child may be a boy or girl of any age, but it is frequently a girl of four to nine years of age at the onset of the sexual abuse which then continues into adolescence. Sexual abuse most commonly occurs between father and daughter, but father-son, mother-daughter and mother-son abuse also occur.

4.4.1.3. Emotional maltreatment, includes ignoring, threatening, terrorizing or blatantly rejecting the child. Emotional maltreatment is the most difficult type to identify. There are few physical indicators to serve as guideposts. The symptoms of emotional maltreatment may be similar to the symptoms of emotional disturbance. Emotional maltreatment is normally identified by trained professionals who examine the behavior of both parents and child.

4.4.2. Indicators. The indicators of child abuse and neglect may be physical or behavioral. Indicators may be seen in the child, parent or interactions between the parent and child. Abuse may be revealed through the child's school, child care center, routine physical examinations or hospital visits. No one indicator by itself proves child abuse or neglect is occurring. However, the presence of several indicators together should alert the security forces to the possibility of child abuse and neglect.

4.4.2.1. Physical indicators include burns, bruises on several different surfaces of the body (in the genital area, over large areas of the body or in various stages of healing), human bite marks, hunger, venereal disease and pregnancy, especially in a child under the age of 13.

4.4.2.2. Behaviorally, maltreated children may be wary of adult contact. They may appear fearful, withdrawn, frightened or hungry. The sexually abused child may have difficulty walking or sitting. The neglected child may beg or steal food.

4.4.2.3. Abusive parents are frequently immature, dependent people who are rigid disciplinarians and have unrealistic expectations of their children. They show little concern for their children or may offer conflicting, improbable or no explanation for their children's condition. They may fail to look at, touch or comfort their children and may expect the children to look after them. In many cases these parents were abused or neglected when they were children.

4.4.2.4. Abusive families are sometimes families under stress. The stress may be financial, personal, job-related, environmental or situational. In any event, it is a situation with which the parent cannot cope. Like spouse abuse, child abuse and neglect may be recurrent, increasing in frequency and severity unless the family receives help.

4.5. The Security Forces Role in Domestic Violence. One of the missions of security forces is to maintain law and order within the command. To reestablish order and preserve the peace, SF personnel are often required to respond to situations of family violence. The primary role in these situations is to take immediate action to restore order and protect lives. In addition, the sponsor's unit commander/first sergeant and the base family advocacy officer must be advised of all incidents of family violence. The AFOSI is responsible for investigating major offenses including child abuse and spouse abuse involving aggravated assault. The local AFOSI detachment must be notified immediately of all child abuse or neglect allegations. Security forces routinely investigate minor incidents of child abuse/neglect and spouse abuse. Incidents should be recorded on AF Form 3545, Incident Report and AF Form 53, Security Police Desk Blotter. When peace has been restored and the appropriate authorities notified of the incident,

the SF member's role has ended, except where an offense has been committed and an apprehension will take place.

4.6. The Unit Commander's Role in Domestic Violence. Unit commanders are responsible for the actions of assigned personnel, both on and off duty. This responsibility includes the behavior of military sponsors and their military family members within military housing areas and in economy housing overseas. SF members should recognize this command responsibility and duty to inform the commander (normally through the first sergeant) of incidents of family violence involving unit personnel and their family members.

4.7. The Family Advocacy Officer's Role in Domestic Violence. The family advocacy officer functions as the central coordinator for the base Family Advocacy Program. Under the direction of the director of base medical services or chief of hospital services, the family advocacy officer performs a number of family violence prevention and intervention services.

4.8. The Security Forces Controller's Role in Domestic Violence . In answering family violence calls, SF controllers must have all available information on the family and situation. The security forces controller has the responsibility for obtaining as much information as possible from the individual making the call while dispatching a patrol unit. When a possible family violence call comes in, the security forces controller:

- 4.8.1. Obtains as much data as possible from the caller asking who is involved, what has happened, when it occurred, where it happened and where the family is now, how the incident occurred, whether weapons are involved or available and if medical aid is required.
- 4.8.2. Asks the caller to describe the situation and for the telephone number from which the call is being made. In this way security forces controller can call back to check the validity of the call and determine whether the situation has changed prior to the arrival of the responding security forces.
- 4.8.3. Relays all information to security forces responding to the situation. If the security forces controller is unable to obtain a clear description of the situation, the responding unit(s) must be so informed.
- 4.8.4. Checks AF Form 1314, Firearms Registration roster or local firearms roster/database.
- 4.8.5. Ensures an appropriate patrol response with follow-up actions and referrals to unit commanders through first sergeants, family advocacy officer or AFOSI. In cases where the reported abuse is not currently ongoing, a patrol response may not be appropriate. In these instances, coordination between the security forces controller and their supervisory chain of command, the unit commander of the military member involved, the AFOSI and the family advocacy officer will determine the appropriate response.
- 4.8.6. In cases of notification by the base hospital of a suspected child abuse incident being treated, AFOSI should be contacted immediately to meet the dispatched patrol.

4.9. Patrol Response.

- 4.9.1. Arriving Safely. The responding patrol(s) should drive to the scene as quickly and safely as possible.

4.9.1.1. The responding patrol(s) should formulate a general plan before arrival. It is wise to determine in advance who will be in charge, who will approach first, who will serve as backup, etc.

4.9.1.2. Use discretion when approaching a house where a domestic disturbance is occurring. Park SF vehicles at least one house away from the address of the incident. Parking directly in front of the house in question may escalate the situation or warn residents to conceal evidence of a crime. For the same reasons, flashing lights and sirens should be off before arrival and there should be no loud noises like slamming car doors or blaring radios.

4.9.2. Approaching the Scene. SF members should use caution when approaching the scene of a family violence complaint.

4.9.2.1. Before approaching the house, SF members should stop and listen. Windows, doors, adjoining buildings or areas of possible concealment should be visually checked for unusual movements or objects.

4.9.2.2. SF members should not consider approaching the side or back door instead of the front door, as they could be mistaken for prowlers.

4.9.2.3. If the approach is made at night and flashlights are used, they should not be shined in windows. Avoid silhouetting the other patrols.

4.9.3. Entry Procedures. SF members should always be dispatched in pairs to family violence calls and should always stand to one side of the door, never in front of it. The second SF member should be behind and to one side of the first, in position to maintain visual contact with the inside of the residence and provide cover.

4.9.3.1. Before knocking, listen at the door for 15-30 seconds. SF members may be able to obtain information on the nature of the disturbance and whether or not it is violent before announcing their presence.

4.9.3.2. Check screen doors before knocking to see whether they are locked. Locked screen doors can create an unexpected barrier between the SF member and residents if immediate action is required.

4.9.3.3. Knock on the door in a reasonable manner, if at all possible, or use the doorbell.

4.9.3.4. Evaluate the risk of entry, even when invited to enter, and respond accordingly.

4.9.3.5. If there is no response at the door and the dwelling appears quiet, the address should be verified with the security forces controller. If the address is correct, the sides and rear of the quarters should be checked for indications of the presence of the occupants. Neighbors may also provide useful information.

4.9.4. Initial Contact with Residents. SF members should display a calm, positive and helpful manner. Initial impressions will set the tone for the interview.

4.9.4.1. When someone answers the door, SF members should introduce and identify themselves and state the reason for their presence.

4.9.4.2. If not invited into the dwelling, SF members should request to move the discussion inside. This will remove the situation from the view of the neighbors and enable SF members to observe:

4.9.4.2.1. Any injuries requiring treatment;

- 4.9.4.2.2. The location and number of the disputants;
- 4.9.4.2.3. Visible weapons and threatening moves;
- 4.9.4.2.4. Living conditions;
- 4.9.4.2.5. Emotional stage of dispute and emotional condition of disputants;
- 4.9.4.2.6. Impairment;
- 4.9.4.2.7. Children at risk; and
- 4.9.4.2.8. Physical damage to property.

4.9.4.3. Separate the disputants as necessary and maintain visual contact with the other security forces member.

4.9.4.4. After providing for any necessary medical assistance and calming the situation, obtain information on the family structure and background. Such information will give important background and data and allow a "cooling off" period. Questions asked may include:

- 4.9.4.4.1. Names and whereabouts of the sponsor and family members;
- 4.9.4.4.2. The sponsor's rank, (and any other military member's) social security number and unit;
- 4.9.4.4.3. Relationship and legal status of residents: i.e., nephew, uncle, boyfriend, girlfriend, valid marriage, for example;
- 4.9.4.4.4. Length of residence in quarters and period assigned to installation;
- 4.9.4.4.5. Ages and relationships of children;
- 4.9.4.4.6. Whether military or civilian police have been required to respond to previous incidents; and
- 4.9.4.4.7. Whether the family has been to family advocacy office.

4.9.5. Visual Observation. Observing conditions inside the quarters while obtaining background information may give ideas of the cause contributing to the situation. The behavior of residents can provide important clues.

- 4.9.5.1. Signs of fear, hate, depression and embarrassment can be detected in facial expressions, eye movements and body positions.
- 4.9.5.2. Be alert for sudden movements and continual glances at closed doors, closets or bureaus. Such actions may be the first indication the individual has a weapon available or is attempting to conceal the presence of an injured family member or other evidence.
- 4.9.5.3. The condition of the home and appearance of the residents may provide clues to family functioning. If the living conditions are unusual, unsafe or unhealthy, SF members may want to arrange for photographs of the scene and request response of the military member's first sergeant or commander.

4.10. Differentiating Types of Disputes.

4.10.1. Violent Disputes. When responding to a violent disturbance, SF members must immediately separate the disputants. If medical attention is required, it should be secured at once.

4.10.1.1. SF members should be vigilant about their personal safety as well as that of disputants. In separating the persons involved, make a visual search for objects that could be used as weapons. The disputants should never be allowed to come between the security force members. Disputants should never be left alone in another room and should not be removed to the kitchen because of the availability of potential weapons. If the disputants cannot be calmed, apprehension and removal to the security forces control center may be necessary.

4.10.1.2. Intoxicated people tend to be violent in disputes. It may be extremely difficult to reason or deal with a person in this condition. The individual may have to be removed from the scene until sober enough to be reasoned with.

4.10.1.3. A potential danger exists in persons who are unusually quiet and controlled in highly emotional disputes. Such people may be near the breaking point and may become violent and upset by an innocent gesture or remark.

4.10.1.4. If the parties can be separated and SF members are not at increased risk, the disputants may be removed out of sight and hearing of each other. Once they are separated and order is restored, the parties may be interviewed.

4.10.2. Verbal Disputes. The difference between violent disputes and verbal disputes is that in a verbal dispute, a physical assault has not occurred. The parties involved may be easier to reason with and prompt solution to the dispute more possible.

4.10.2.1. Remove the disputants to separate rooms if possible. Avoid leaving them alone or in the kitchen.

4.10.2.2. Separating normally causes a distraction to the disputants. If SF members use a calm, firm and assured tone of voice, it may further distract the disputants and better control the situation. Once they are separated and order is restored, the parties may be interviewed.

4.10.2.3. Disputes Involving Children. In disputes where one disputant is a child or young adult, there may be a feeling in the youth of resentment against authority figures. The youth may assume that security forces will automatically side with the parents. Therefore, when answering such a disturbance call, an attitude of concern and understanding for the child's version of the argument is important. The youth's feelings, problems and thoughts should be listened to and evaluated as carefully as those of the parents or other disputants. However, take care not to interfere with parental rights regarding the children. If other children are present, but not involved in the dispute, the parents should be asked to remove them from the room.

4.10.2.4. The Role of Alcohol. Alcohol is involved to some extent in many situations of family violence. If one family member is intoxicated, it may be difficult to obtain factual information from that person. Other sources of information may have to be obtained.

4.11. Attitude of Responding Security Forces.

4.11.1. Importance. The attitude of the responding security forces is important and, in many cases, will determine the attitude and cooperation of the family members involved. Realize that people may be hostile or angry, frightened or abusive, ashamed or uncooperative; when law enforcement personnel appear at their door. They may view the security forces as intruders and resent their presence.

Carefully consider your opening remarks and questions. The SF member's approach should be calm, controlled and concerned. Care should be taken to avoid sarcastic or critical remarks, an impolite tone of voice or threatening or aggressive body positions. Hostility, indifference or aggression may provoke further violence while a sensitive and tactful approach may restore order and calm the situation.

4.11.2. Best Approach. In responding to a call, keep in mind that each situation is different and must be treated individually. Meanings and attitudes might be read into words, facial expression and body positions. The best approach is a calm and positive one.

4.12. The Interview.

4.12.1. Purpose: The purpose of the interview is to:

4.12.1.1. Assess the immediate danger to family members and need for medical assistance or protective custody;

4.12.1.2. Determine whether suspected abuse or neglect is occurring;

4.12.1.3. Determine the appropriate response to the situation;

4.12.1.4. Identify the perpetrator;

4.12.1.5. Protect the legal rights of suspects; and

4.12.1.6. Identify victims and give them proper assistance.

4.12.2. Gathering Information. Once the parties have been separated, each person should be interviewed.

4.13. Security Forces Actions. Three actions may occur in family violence situations; referral, temporary separation or apprehension. After order has been restored, one or more of these actions is possible.

4.13.1. Referral. If the security forces controller has not already done so, request the unit commander or first sergeant, AFOSI and the family advocacy officer be notified of the situation, as appropriate. The family advocacy officer must be notified of all incidents or complaints involving child or spouse abuse. The SF member's role in this instance is to maintain order, secure the scene as necessary and stand by until relieved or advised of further responsibility for the case.

4.13.2. Temporary Separation. Family members may be separated to ensure safety and protection. For example, the first sergeant may suggest that a spouse temporarily leave the quarters or a commander may order the separation by confining the military member to a dormitory or military lodging facility. The hospital may admit a child for medical treatment or observation when medically appropriate. If a child's safety is threatened, take appropriate action under state law, including contacting child protective services. AFOSI has primary jurisdiction for serious child abuse or neglect involving infliction of serious bodily harm. The SF member's role in this instance is to provide whatever support if requested by the hospital or commander.

4.13.3. Apprehension. Apprehension may be the most prudent course of action when

4.13.3.1. There is a formal complaint;

4.13.3.2. Probable cause exists that a violation of the UCMJ or local law has occurred and

4.13.3.3. The family member refuses to cooperate with security forces, unit commander or first sergeant or family advocacy officials.

4.13.4. In all instances involving an apprehension, an AF Form 3545, detailing the situation, security forces response and the parties responsible for follow-up actions must be completed.

4.13.5. Security forces personnel investigating domestic abuse/violence must ensure victims and witnesses are provided DD Form 2701, *Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime*, to ensure victims/witnesses are aware of their rights under the Victim and Witness Assistance Program.

Chapter 5

PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE

5.1. School Violence. Response to school violence is an emotional event for all involved. In recent years there have been many incidents of violence in schools throughout the United States. Although incidents of this nature are rare, many Air Force installations have either DoD or locally sponsored schools on the installation. As a result, installation commanders must ensure proper planning and exercises are conducted. Close coordination between base and school officials is essential to successful conclusion(s) to any school-related incident.

5.2. Planning. Security forces should coordinate with school officials and become familiar with school policies concerning incidents on school grounds at their installation. Each school district has different policies and actions required based on incidents. If an installation school has no policies in force, base officials, including security forces, should assist them in establishing such policies. Security forces should inform school officials on their response capabilities and procedures as well, so all parties involved are comfortable with processes involved in response to school violence.

5.2.1. Jurisdiction. Local staff judge advocates (SJAs), provide advice on the implications of installation jurisdiction requirements for schools located on Air Force installations. Jurisdictional requirements will necessitate different and varying responses by security forces.

5.2.2. Diagrams and Maps. Security forces should have maps of school facilities and grounds immediately available to assist in responses to violence.

5.2.3. Cordons. Security forces should predetermine cordons for response to eliminate confusion that may occur upon notification of an incident at an installation school.

5.2.4. Use of security forces personnel assigned duties as instructors at the schools [Drug Abuse Resistance and Education (DARE) instructors] is encouraged for coordination and exercising plans due to their knowledge of the children and the children being able to identify with and follow instructions from these personnel.

5.2.5. Coordinate with school officials for periodic walk-throughs with a MWD to familiarize the canine and handlers with school facilities.

5.2.6. EST should coordinate with school officials to train within the complex during periods when school is not in session (weekends, spring breaks, holidays, etc.).

5.3. Reporting. School officials should immediately lock down the school and notify security forces for immediate response to school incidents. The lock-down process is necessary to ensure the safety of their students and accountability of students and personnel. School officials should report school violence incidents using the installation's emergency response telephone numbers or alarms, when available.

5.4. Initial Response. As in other high-risk situations, it is important that security forces immediately contain the situation or enclose the scene.

5.5. Media. Media interest at scenes of school violence will be high. Ensure the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) is immediately involved in establishing a media reception plan and media center to assist with information flow.

5.6. Parents. As mentioned earlier, parental requirements at the scene will be challenging. The OSC should establish an area for parents to respond to and receive information. The PAO is responsible for all information flow; however, Family Support Center, chaplains and medical personnel can assist with this. Give parents appropriate information for the situation.

Chapter 6

WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

6.1. Workplace Violence. At each installation, the civilian personnel office is the point of contact for workplace violence. The CSF is a key player in the Workplace Violence Program and must coordinate on any installation plans concerning this program.

6.2. Planning. It is difficult to plan for workplace violence due to the many variations of work places throughout the installation. Close coordination with the Civilian Personnel Flight and installation unit commanders will ensure prompt notification of any personnel with potential problems. As soon as a possible situation develops, the CSF must properly develop a plan specific to the problem workplace. Close coordination with the installation SJA is also required. Additional information concerning workplace violence is available from the Office of Personnel Management at website

<http://www.opm.gov/ehs/workplac/index.htm>.

Chapter 7

USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD

7.1. Introduction: Use of force review boards (UFRB) are an important tool used to gather lessons learned and other essential information concerning the use of force involving SF members. Testimony derived from the use of force review board may not be used in criminal proceedings.

7.2. When to Convene a Board and Its Purpose. A UFRB will be convened for most use of force events where an injury results or where there is potential for publicity. A UFRB will be convened for all shooting incidents (except for inadvertent clearing barrel incidents) or any use of force event resulting in death. HQ AF/XOF will appoint a disinterested SF member in the grade of O-6 or GS-15 as the board president. The MAJCOM SF director responsible for the individuals involved in the shooting cannot serve as the board president. The president may elect to have board members convene at the location of the shooting or as close as possible or may elect to assign tasks without physically convening members. Ideally, the board should convene within 14-30 days of the incident.

7.2.1. The board's purpose is to provide an all-encompassing evaluation that includes the results of the investigation or inquiry and:

7.2.1.1. Determine if events and facts surrounding the incident were accurately investigated and completely reported;

7.2.1.2. Determine if the SF member(s) acted within the scope of their authority, current policy and current procedure; and

7.2.1.3. Recommend changes, if needed, in SF use of force and tactics policies, procedures or training.

7.3. Board Members and Their Responsibilities. The board structure is, at a minimum:

7.3.1. The Board President. The board president should:

7.3.1.1. Establish the board and determine its final composition;

7.3.1.2. Preside over the board and make final determination on the issues; and

7.3.1.3. Will serve as the investigative focal point and conduct a comprehensive review of the incident focusing on administrative rules and procedures as well as criminal procedures

7.3.2. HQ Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC) Representative. The HQ AFSFC representative will conduct the UFRB investigation, per the direction of the UFRB president. The HQ AFSFC representative will have the same access to the participant, witness and the crime scene as the local investigators. All information gathered by investigative bodies must be made available to the HQ AFSFC representative.

7.3.3. Psychologist. An AF psychologist will be assigned to the board and will:

7.3.3.1. Provide psychological expertise and insights to the board; and

7.3.3.2. Evaluate the involved SF members and make referrals to qualified counselors when needed.

7.3.4. HQ USAF/JA. An attorney will:

7.3.4.1. Serve as the legal advisor to the board, AF/XOF and HQ AFSFC representative, but not to the involved SF members; and

7.3.4.2. Offer advice to the local SJA, if requested, and conduct liaison with higher legal staffs.

7.3.5. HQ AFOSI Representative. The HQ AFOSI representative will provide investigative expertise, as required.

7.3.6. A first-line security forces supervisor from a different installation. This member will provide a practical perspective on daily security forces operations.

7.3.7. Other Members. The UFRB president will determine other members of the UFRB (additional advisors, administrator, etc.).

7.3.7.1. The investigators who conducted the investigation will not be included as UFRB members. The UFRB president should have the investigators appear before the board to brief the facts of the investigation and answer any questions. The investigators will not, however, be involved in making determinations or recommendations such as those outlined in paragraphs 7.2.1.1. through 7.2.1.3.

7.4. Legal Considerations for a Shooting Incident. Historically, local law enforcement agencies have investigative responsibility for shootings within their territorial jurisdictions. That responsibility does not change simply because one of the participants is a law enforcement officer. Accordingly, an SF member involved in a shooting incident off base, or where there is concurrent or proprietary jurisdiction, should anticipate an investigation by local authorities in addition to a review by the UFRB. Consult the local SJA regarding scope of employment as noted above, and therefore be protected from state prosecution.

7.5. The Use of Force Review Board Report. The UFRB report will contain the following information. Include additional information as needed. The report will be distributed as deemed necessary by AF/XOF.

7.5.1. A summary of the facts and circumstances surrounding the shooting. Attach all documents reviewed. A security forces firearms discharge report must be completed by the unit involved in a shooting and will be included as part of the report;

7.5.2. A summary of all interviews conducted by the UFRB;

7.5.3. Findings of the UFRB, including misconduct or commendation;

7.5.4. Dissenting opinions;

7.5.5. Any identified training issues;

7.5.6. Any identified policy issues; and

7.5.7. Recommendations of the UFRB.

Chapter 8

SECURITY FORCES POST-SHOOTING PROTOCOLS

8.1. Introduction. It is well established and acknowledged within the US law enforcement community that the use of deadly force by a law enforcement personnel is an event with very serious potential for significant subsequent psychological and physiological trauma for the member involved. One generation of research (1980-2000) and experiences are essentially available to use as a benchmark and context for the development of post-shooting protocols and model policy development within the security forces.

8.2. Background:

8.2.1. Subject matter experts agree that participation in the use of deadly force and the taking of human life are traumatic for a number of very foundational reasons; the event is likely to have been sudden and unexpected, the event represented a very real threat to the law enforcement official's existence and well-being, the event may include an element of profound loss (e.g., partner, physical ability, position within the agency) and the event may result in an abrupt change in the law enforcement official's values, self-confidence or ideals (having collided directly with the basic moral that one shall not take the life of another).

8.2.2. Reactions by the official to the event pass through stages which often include being stunned or bewildered, accompanied by an inability to cope with normal situations; followed by the recoil stage in which the official may feel compelled to retell the experience and attempt to overcome it through retelling; often followed by a host of chronic or lingering personal reactions that may include depression, impotent rage, withdrawal, anxiety, hopelessness, insomnia, nightmares and psychologically reexperiencing the incident itself.

8.2.3. The best research is the most recent research in this area and represents a body of scientific knowledge to which contributions are made regularly. We now have a fundamental understanding of the physical and psychological dynamics that accompany a law enforcement member-involved shooting and can now examine and understand the principles of action versus reaction, response time and the psycho-physical factors confronted during split-second violent encounters. It is now acknowledged that post traumatic stress often manifests itself following a law enforcement official involved shooting and there are strategies available to deal with that phenomenon. Some specific recent research suggests that 33% of police personnel involved in critical incidents suffer memory loss of some portion of the event and perhaps as many suffer the acute reaction of repeated flashbacks.

8.3. The Basic Model. Although variations may be found in different law enforcement agencies, the most common elements of a post-shooting protocol, designed to support the official in the aftermath of the event (this does not address the investigative protocols), include the following:

8.3.1. Removal of the Security Force Member From the Shooting Scene. This is done in an effort to give the SF member a place to which they can retreat, collect their thoughts and begin the process of recalling and reconciling the event. Most departments emphasize that in conjunction with this physical removal, the SF member should not be left entirely alone at any time. It is generally recommended that a supervisor or companion SF member remain for immediate emotional support. It is also not recommended that the SF member be so far removed that they are unable to describe to the arriving

investigators what happened. The objective here is to provide some solitude and privacy for the SF member but, at the same time, not subconsciously make them a pariah through physical isolation.

8.3.2. **Summoning a Chaplain.** Chaplains, by virtue of their roles and training, are prepared to provide immediate and sustained emotional support and counseling to the SF members and should be involved early rather than late. Similarly, if the unit has specially trained (peer officers), they should be available to provide companionship, support to the member and their family and share perspectives and insights as only a peer can do. Obviously, the agency's selection process and training for its peer support members are critical to success of the program. In addition, most installations have a team of helping agency professionals (family support, Life Skills Support Center (formerly the mental health clinic), chaplains, Red Cross, etc.) that should be called in immediately. The earlier there is skilled intervention, the less traumatic the event is for the SF member in the short and long term.

8.3.3. **Replacement of Surrendered Weapon.** Virtually without exception, every investigating agency will require the SF member involved in a major incident provide their weapon as part of the investigative and evidentiary process. Much of our experience now indicates the surrendering of the weapon, without replacing it, can be interpreted by the involved SF member as a symbolic message that they are no longer worthy and can not be trusted. This is not the case; however, installation chiefs of security forces must determine the suitability of the individual to continue to carry a firearm.

8.3.4. **Suspension from Weapon-Carrying Duties.** There is very strong consensus that the involved SF member should be administratively suspended from their weapons responsibilities until either the investigation is complete (or there is reasonable assurance of its conclusion) and a Life Skill Support Center professional has examined the individual and made a determination that there are no compelling reasons why the SF member should not return to full duty. This suspension must be handled in a dignified fashion, be a matter of routine within the squadron (so that no one SF member feels a particular stigma) and not leave the SF member feeling isolated, ostracized or disenfranchised. All SF units have well-established alternate duty assignments fully employed within the squadron where personnel can be fully employed until return to duty can be finalized. Keeping the SF member fully informed during this time is crucial to their continuing sense of inclusion and worthiness. This suspension also serves to protect the unit against any possibility of additional liability should the involved SF member be found to have erred in their decision making, and protects the SF member from being prematurely placed in a situation which could include the potential of another deadly force decision before the current event is reconciled.

8.3.5. **Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD).** This is an opportunity for the SF unit to bring together all of the SF members involved in the deadly force event, as a group, and provide a psychological debriefing soon after the incident. It is designed to alleviate the stress aftermath and in particular, the emergence of post traumatic stress disorder. CISD acknowledges deadly force occurrences bring an overwhelming emotional response from the law enforcement officials involved and create emotional effects that go beyond the SF members' normal coping abilities. Through a trained group (Helping agencies described in Para. 8.3.2.), emotions and reactions are discussed, feelings are vented, SF members are allowed to discover through the exchange and instruction that their responses are not abnormal. This should occur 24-72 hours after the incident and attendance is mandatory. Participating SF members should have been alerted to the CISD through an initial defusing meeting preparing them for this setting. These are not operational critiques and must enjoy a significant level of confidentiality. If only one SF member is involved in the event, the CISD should include other SF

members (volunteers) who have either experienced a similar event or been trained in its effects, if available. Some indicators of critical incident stress are:

- 8.3.5.1. Sleeping problems, often with vivid dreams or nightmares;
- 8.3.5.2. Fatigue;
- 8.3.5.3. Anxiety and tension;
- 8.3.5.4. Sadness, crying and depression;
- 8.3.5.5. Repetitive and intrusive thoughts about the incidents;
- 8.3.5.6. Hyper-alertness or startled responses;
- 8.3.5.7. Guilty feelings and wondering if he/she did the right thing;
- 8.3.5.8. Trouble remembering or concentrating;
- 8.3.5.9. Anger; and/or
- 8.3.5.10. Drinking alcoholic beverages more than usual or to excess.

8.3.6. Pre- and Post Mobilization/Training of Agency's Support Roles. Beyond the dedicated functions of life skills support center professionals, chaplains or peer support members, the greatest support assistance for the involved SF member can come from fellow unit members, immediate supervisors, unit commanders and the member's family. The key is to prepare these support providers for their role and ensure their preparation to provide support is current, appropriate and reflect the body of scientific knowledge that exists about the aftermath of traumatic events. Best intentions are not sufficient to rely upon, learning and training must be in place.

8.3.7. Continuing Peer Support for as Long as is Necessary. Peer support can validate, normalize and legitimize the involved SF member's reactions, both during the event and afterwards. Peer support encourages survivors to cope positively and constructively.

8.3.8. Continuing Life Skills Support Center Intervention. The inclusion of mental health interventions in the post-shooting process must be a non negotiable requirement. For the squadron, this ensures that a professional medical assessment is made of the SF member before they are returned to full duty and the potential to again face a deadly force situation. For the SF member, making this a mandatory step de-stigmatizes their participation and simply becomes part of the larger follow-up process. Life Skills Support Center intervention can also include the use of employee assistance programs, but the key is that any provider of mental health intervention must be schooled in the psychological and physiological dynamics of deadly force encounters. We know that there are very unique and, until recently, misunderstood forces at work during such an event (perhaps replicated only in the battlefield) that must be understood in order for the mental health intervention to be successful.

8.3.9. Return to Full Duty. Only the installation chief of security forces can make this decision within a squadron, and the decision should be reached with the participation of the installation's Life Skills Support Center intervention resources. Particular attention must be paid in the weeks and months that follow a return to full duty because it is often suggested that the greatest anxiety encountered by the involved SF member does not manifest itself until they are released to resume normal law SF duties. This calls for a sustained and incremental monitoring process to ensure the SF member's recovery and renewed success.

8.4. Family Issues. Family members often become upset or worried when a shooting incident occurs. Painful memories may be revived if an individual was involved in a similar incident in the past.

8.4.1. SF members may react to the stress of a shooting with increased irritability at home. Sometimes, the stress may temporarily strain a marital relationship. All family members should expect to be affected by some level of stress reaction.

8.4.2. Some SF members or their spouses may want to protect their young children by not telling them about the incident. This usually fails to work because of open publicity. Children frequently hear distorted or inaccurate accounts from friends or acquaintances and are upset both by the accounts and the fact their parents have not told them. Young children usually sense when something important has happened to one of their parents, and if the SF members do not offer an explanation, they will construct one themselves, often one that involves unrealistic self-blame or responsibility. SF members can avoid these problems by giving children a simple, age-appropriate explanation.

8.4.3. Children may be aware of the shooting incident but may be afraid to talk to their parents because their parents clearly did not want to share it with them. A good approach is to ask the children if they have heard anything about what happened. Then, let them respond without interruption so unrealistic ideas can emerge and be corrected gently. Reassure young children they are safe with their parents and that a bad guy is not going to hurt them. If SF member was injured, reassurance may be more difficult, but is still appropriate. Children's fears are often different from, and worse than, the reality of the situation. If it is decided not to tell the children, a cautious inquiry about whether they have heard anything is still recommended.

8.5. Successful Coping. SF members can cope with these situations and will probably be stronger and wiser afterwards. Many law enforcement officials have experienced shooting incidents and had the chance to evaluate what was most helpful in coping with them. The following suggestions are based on their experiences.

8.5.1. Sharing the experience with others was the most helpful technique. Almost every law enforcement officer involved in a shooting was significantly helped by talking and listening to other law enforcement officers who had similar experiences. A major reason was the perception that someone who had not been involved in a shooting incident could not understand what it was like. It may be helpful for SF members to postpone taking administrative leave until they have had an opportunity to talk to other police officers who have had similar experiences they can share. The local police department, sheriff or FBI office can put personnel in contact with others who have been involved in a shooting incident. The more people an SF member can contact who have successfully coped with this type of experience, the better.

8.5.2. It is also helpful for individuals to talk to their spouse, family members and close friends. The value of talking about the incident with a spouse, family member or close friend ranked nearly as high as sharing the experience with others who had similar experiences. The SF member does not have to put up a front or pretend to be tough for a spouse or a close friend. The SF member can, and should, unburden him/herself in these confidential relationships. FBI agents and their spouses described intense marathon talking sessions in the period after a shooting where the FBI agent "let it all out." They report feeling better afterward. The important thing is to keep the lines of communication open.

8.5.2.1. The SF member's spouse can best support them by being available and ready to devote the time and energy this sharing requires. The most important thing is being there to listen as long

as the member needs to talk. Listening is more important than reassurance or sympathy, although they are helpful also. A marriage does not have to be perfect to offer this helping and healing effect.

8.5.2.2. An individual's spouse can also benefit from the same technique to cope successfully with the stresses of a shooting incident.

8.5.3. These factors were also helpful to other FBI agents. These are individual factors; they may or may not work for each individual.

8.5.3.1. Keeping a sense of humor.

8.5.3.2. Returning to the normal work routine.

8.5.3.3. Physical activity.

8.5.3.4. Religious beliefs or practices.

8.5.3.5. Keeping an individual's mind off the incident.

8.6. Positive Aspects. There is no question that a shooting incident is traumatic. Yet, FBI agents also identified some positive effects. FBI agents felt they had learned they could trust people and count on them in a crisis, in spite of the problems associated with post-shooting incident investigations. They felt they had met the test of the most severe stress, were more confident in themselves and less pressured to prove themselves in other situations. They felt they would be able to handle whatever happened in the future.

8.6.1. Some FBI agents became more cautious and concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger--they now knew these things didn't only happen to the other person. They could experience feelings of regret or sympathy for the subjects and, at the same time, know they had done the only possible thing under the circumstances. As with any personal crisis, FBI agents often reevaluated what was important in their lives, their goals and their values, and found their new perspectives helpful.

8.7. Forms Adopted. AF Form 53, **Security Forces Desk Blotter**, AF Form 1314, **Firearms Registration**, and AF Form 3545, **Incident Report**.

CHARLES F. WALD, Lt General, USAF
DCS, Air and Space Operations

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFI 13-207, *Preventing and Resisting Aircraft Piracy(Hijacking)*

AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*

AFI 71-101 Vol 1, *Criminal Investigations*

DoD 5210.14M/AF Sup 1, *Nuclear Security Weapons Manual.*

DoD 0-2000-12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Disturbance*

DoDD 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*

DoD Directive 5525.7, *Implementation of Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense Relating to the Investigative and Prosecution of Certain Crimes*

Posse Comitatus Act

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFB—Air Force Base

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFSFC—Headquarters, Air Force Security Forces Center

CISD—Critical Incident Stress Debriefing

CINC—Commander in Chief

CSF—Chief of Security Forces

DCG—Disaster Control Group

DoD—Department of Defense

DOJ—Department of Justice

DOS—Department of State

DCG—Disaster Control Group

ECP—Entry Control Point

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EST—Emergency Services Team

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigations

FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency

LEA—Law Enforcement Agency

MTT—Mobile Training Team

NDA—National Defense Area

OSC—On-scene commander

PAO—Public Affairs Officer

SF—Security Forces

SJA—Staff Judge Advocate

UFRB—Use of Force Review Board

Attachment 2**SECURITY FORCES FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT**

A2.1. Report Format. The firearms discharge report should accurately and chronologically document the investigation or inquiry and include the events precipitating the shooting. This report is mandatory and will be completed as part of the investigation into the shooting incident.

- A2.1.1. Full name of security forces (SF) member who discharged the firearm.
- A2.1.2. Rank of SF member who discharged the firearm.
- A2.1.3. Date of birth of SF member who discharged the firearm.
- A2.1.4. SF members total active federal military service date
- A2.1.5. Length of time as an SF member.
- A2.1.6. Duty status (on or off-duty) at time of incident.
- A2.1.7. If on duty, type of assignment, case number, etc.
- A2.1.8. Date of incident. Include the day of week and time of day.
- A2.1.9. Was the weapon at “ready pistol” or drawn when used?
- A2.1.10. Whether the discharge was intentional or unintentional.
- A2.1.11. The type of ammunition used (e.g., hollow point or ball).
- A2.1.12. Were the sights used?
- A2.1.13. SF member’s shooting position (standing, kneeling, etc.).
- A2.1.14. Number of shots fired.
- A2.1.15. Number of shots that hit the target.
- A2.1.16. Number of subjects encountered (also note any apprehension/detention made or planned at this time, any previous criminal records, whether drugs were present in the subject's system at the time of the incident).
- A2.1.17. Where did the rounds impact on the target (include medical reports clarifying the nature and gravity of all wounds to the SF member, subject and others; indicate entry and exit of individual shots)?
- A2.1.18. Where did rounds impact if they missed the target? Indicate damage incurred, if applicable.
- A2.1.19. Was a reload done?
- A2.1.20. Did the weapon function properly?
- A2.1.21. Distance at which the shooting took place.
- A2.1.22. Lighting conditions present at time of shooting.
- A2.1.23. SF member’s current qualification date with weapon used.
- A2.1.24. Were there any innocent victims? If yes, what is their condition?

A2.1.25. What type of weapons and ammunition were being used by the subjects?

A2.1.26. What is the current disposition or custody of all weapons (including the SF member's) and remaining ammunition?

A2.1.27. Prosecutive status of the subjects/SF member(s).

A2.1.28. Associated case numbers and copies of related operational plans, if any.

A2.1.29. Is there a continuing threat as a result of the shooting? Are any SF members, other military personnel, witnesses, sources, other law enforcement officers or their families in danger? If so, what is planned to counteract the threat?

A2.1.30. Are there any legal issues, problems or evidence of misconduct or malfeasance? If so, who is involved and to what extent?

A2.1.31. What is the potential for adverse publicity?

A2.1.32. What local, state and/or federal authorities have been notified?

A2.2. Outside Resources Required. What outside resources or assistance do members require?

A2.3. Included Documents. Include the following documents, when applicable, and any other materials or documents related to the investigation or inquiry.

A2.3.1. Interviews of personnel involved. Include statements of all SF/AFOSI personnel.

A2.3.2. Investigation regarding the subject. Include such information as criminal record, if available, and interviews of associates that are relevant to the shooting (crime partner, co-detainee, etc.).

A2.3.3. Medical reports. Include medical reports and interviews with medical personnel clarifying the nature and gravity of all wounds to the SF member, the subject and others. Indicate the type of weapon used and entry and exit of individual shots, if determinable. If fatalities are involved, include coroner or autopsy reports.

A2.4. Report of vehicles involved. Describe all pertinent vehicles and indicate damage incurred. Describe any other property damage and approximate value of the property.

A2.5. Report of weapons involved. Include information stating the type of all weapons and ammunition used and their current disposition. Include serial numbers, identify the number of rounds used and by what type firearm.

A2.6. Maps, diagrams or photos of the shooting scene. Give the date, time and exact location of the shooting incident. Include any items of benefit in explaining the SF member's actions or reconstructing the shooting scene that are not contained in the body of the report, e.g., video or film from local news agencies.

A2.7. Police reports. Include copies of reports, if available, plus any statements made regarding possible prosecutive action against SF member(s). Include copies of any communications with the local prosecuting attorney.

A2.8. Lab Reports. Include any laboratory reports.